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Abstract
We examine value creation and destruction in the tobacco industry due to the radical litigation
strategy pursued by Brooke Group and its CEO, Bennett LeBow.  Brooke Group has a tiny
market share, low margins, high leverage, and a high concentration of management ownership. 
Beginning in 1996 the firm reached settlements in lawsuits brought against all cigarette companies
by class action plaintiffs and U.S. state governments.  Brooke Group’s actions, which included
promises to cooperate in litigation against its rivals, spurred other companies to reach settlements
on less favorable terms.  The settlements eventually led to massive wealth destruction within the
tobacco industry but impressive returns for shareholders of Brooke Group.
1Wealth Creation and Destruction from 
Brooke Group's Tobacco Litigation Strategy
1.  Introduction
On March 13, 1996, Bennett LeBow, Chairman, CEO and controlling shareholder of
Brooke Group Ltd., announced that his firm had agreed to settle Castano v. American Tobacco
Co., 84 F. 3d 734 (1996), a class action lawsuit filed by cigarette smokers against the major U.S.
tobacco companies.  Within two days LeBow also reached settlements with five U.S. states that
had sued cigarette manufacturers to recover the cost of tobacco-related Medicaid and Medicare
expenses.  A more comprehensive settlement between LeBow's company and 22 plaintiff states
followed in March 1997.  By breaking ranks with industry counterparts who had steadfastly
maintained no responsibility for health hazards of smoking, LeBow set the stage for the larger
settlement that the industry reached with 46 state governments in November 1998.
Brooke Group owns a controlling interest in Liggett, the fifth largest cigarette maker in
the U.S.  Liggett has a tiny market share, and Brooke Group's capital structure and ownership
pattern differ significantly from those of other tobacco companies.  Brooke Group's settlements of
smoking lawsuits had a dramatic impact on share prices throughout the industry: over the two
days following the initial March 1996 announcements, more than $7 billion disappeared from the
market capitalization of other tobacco companies, while Brooke Group's equity value rose by $30
2million, a net-of-market abnormal gain of nearly 20 percent.  Similar patterns of returns occurred
over the subsequent three years as the tobacco industry's litigation strategy evolved from defiance
toward conciliation.  Brooke Group shareholders earned returns that were modest in dollar value
but enormous in percentage terms, as LeBow repeatedly obtained lenient settlements for his
company while agreeing to assist plaintiffs and regulators in their efforts against his far larger
rivals.  In contrast, other tobacco investors lost billions as the legal environment's deterioration --
abetted by LeBow's cooperation with outsiders -- motivated companies to settle litigation on
terms they had once viewed as unimaginable.
 This paper follows LeBow's management of Liggett beginning in 1986, when he
purchased its tobacco operations from Grand Metropolitan Plc. in a highly leveraged transaction. 
In many ways Liggett and LeBow epitomized the move towards debt financing and concentrated
ownership in corporate America during the 1980s.  In a series of mostly unsuccessful investments,
LeBow pursued a strategy of buying financially troubled companies with junk bond financing,
raising their value through asset sales and operational improvements, and recouping his
investment by selling a minority stake in an initial public offering.  This approach was designed to
give LeBow handsome profits on his initial investment while allowing him to retain residual
control of the firm.  His performance as a creator of shareholder value was at best mixed;
Business Week in a 1996 profile described LeBow as a "minor-league bottom-fisher" and "third-
tier wheeler-dealer" (Lesly, 1996), and several of his investments led to bankruptcies and
shareholder lawsuits.  Table 1 gives a chronology of LeBow's major ventures apart from Liggett.
Stock return data indicate that LeBow’s Brooke Group shareholders earned handsome
returns while other tobacco company stocks performed poorly amid the turmoil LeBow helped
1 RJR-Nabisco spun off its R.J. Reynolds tobacco operations into a stand-alone company on June 15, 1999.
Calculations of shareholder returns throughout the paper use the stock of RJR-Nabisco prior to that date, and R.J.
Reynolds thereafter.
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create.  Figure I shows the value over time of a $1.00 investment in the four public U.S. tobacco
stocks on August 1, 1995, the approximate beginning of LeBow's restructuring activities; the
graph extends to September 30, 1999, soon after the announcement of the U.S. government’s
lawsuit against the industry.  For comparison purposes, the results of a $1.00 investment in the
S&P 500 Index are also shown.  A $1.00 investment in Brooke Group would have grown in value
to $4.35 during the time studied, compared to an outcome of $2.28 from investing in the market
index.  All three of the other tobacco stocks -- Philip Morris, RJR-Nabisco,1 and Loews – trailed
the market during this period, yielding $1.71, $1.28, and $1.22, respectively, from a hypothetical
$1.00 investment.  Since the other firms were far larger than Brooke Group, their loss in market
capitalization represented a small transfer of value to Brooke Group, and a much larger transfer to
legal claimants, principally state governments.
Within the tobacco industry, LeBow's efforts to create value differed markedly from the
strategies of his rivals.  While other companies were preoccupied with overseas expansion and
cutthroat domestic battles for market share, LeBow paid little attention to the product markets
and instead focused on changing the financial structure of Liggett.  His initiatives involved a series
of attempts to limit legal liabilities associated with tobacco-related illnesses.  Although these
liabilities were hypothetical at the time that LeBow acquired Liggett, we argue that he viewed
them as an enormous contingent claim against his firm's assets and a significant part of Brooke
Group's capital structure.  Accordingly, LeBow sought to raise the value of his equity investment
by taking actions that he hoped would reduce expected damage payments by his firm.
4Our paper contributes to the literature on how the incentive effects of debt impact
corporate strategy and the value of the firm.  The example of Brooke Group suggests that these
effects are intensified by the presence of potential legal liabilities which can be viewed as a form of
pseudo-debt.  While tobacco companies have operated within a unique regulatory and political
environment, our findings also have relevance for other types of firms that face large hypothetical
liabilities, such as those in the handgun, chemical or nuclear power industries.  The analysis also
has implications for issues such as financial market and product market interaction and the costs
and benefits of concentrated ownership.
Figure II provides a schematic of Brooke Group's capital structure using actual 1995
values of long-term debt (book value) and equity (market value).  In addition to these traditional
components of capital structure, the figure includes a third piece, the expected value of future
legal liabilities.  Among investors and analysts, these potential damage payments were widely
viewed as a drag on firms' equity values; securities analysts often cited legal liability concerns as
the reason that tobacco stocks did not trade at the same multiples as equities in comparable
industries like food and agricultural products.  LeBow's strategy amounted to reducing or
eliminating the value of these claims, hoping to transfer the asset value shown on the left side of
Figure 1 from legal claimants to equity investors.
LeBow's strategy to reduce litigation exposure evolved through three distinct phases. 
First, in conjunction with raider Carl Icahn, LeBow attempted to merge Liggett's tobacco
operations with those of RJR-Nabisco and engineer a spinoff of RJR's non-tobacco assets, in
order to isolate those assets from the reach of potential jury verdicts.  Second, in the midst of his
battle for RJR, LeBow settled the Castano and state lawsuits, hoping that RJR shareholders
2 France (1998) describes how tobacco firms' counsel worked together over a period of years to coordinate the
industry's litigation strategy.  Seib (1998) provides an account of how campaign contributions led to a "special relationship"
between the tobacco industry and the Republican party.
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would view the settlement terms favorably and therefore support his bid for control.  However,
RJR shareholders repudiated this strategy and backed management in an April 1996 proxy vote. 
Finally, faced with objections within the industry over his attempts to reduce litigation exposure,
LeBow turned against his competitors, settled lawsuits on his own, and began cooperating with
government regulatory and litigation efforts.
LeBow’s strategic perspective differed wildly from the publicly announced beliefs of other
companies in the industry, who disingenuously insisted they faced zero potential legal liability and
buttressed this position with aggressive publicity capaigns, litigation defense, and contributions to
public officials.2  For this strategy to succeed, the industry required unanimous participation from
its members, given that all companies had similar access to potentially damaging legal materials. 
However, the incentives for LeBow to participate in this scheme were not clear-cut.  LeBow
realized only a tiny share of the benefits from the industry’s coordinated defiance, given his firm’s
negligible market share, and its high leverage meant that any costs of deviating from the group
strategy would have fallen largely on LeBow’s debtholders (and his rivals).  If regulators or
litigators secured LeBow’s cooperation, they could extract enormous economic rents from other,
larger tobacco companies and potentially share this value with LeBow, leaving him with far more
than he was earning from the operation of Liggett.  We are surprised that other tobacco firms did
not pay greater heed to the possibility that LeBow would adopt this viewpoint and break ranks.
Given Brooke Group’s capital structure, LeBow's maverick actions seem to fit squarely
with Jensen and Meckling's (1976) predictions about the owner-manager of an extremely levered
6firm, who should be expected to pursue risky strategies with high possible payoffs but low
probabilities of success.  These risk-shifting incentives arising from the conflicts of interest
between equity and risky debt have been discussed extensively in the finance literature (see Green
(1984) and John (1987)).  Additionally, our paper highlights the less documented conflicts of
interest between security holders (debt, equity) and other claimants against the firm (employees,
suppliers, consumers, and society at large).  This issue is addressed by Shleifer and Summers
(1988), who argue that the financial gains from takeovers may partly represent wealth transfers
from employees and communities.  In the tobacco industry, the struggle over assets between
equity holders and litigation claimants has resembled similar conflicts in such industries as
asbestos (Johns Manville), birth control devices (A.H. Robins), and silicone breast implants (Dow
Corning).
In addition to its implications for the incentive properties of debt, our paper has relevance
for legal theories of plea bargaining in which the first mover obtains more lenient treatment by
agreeing to cooperate with authorities.  Kobayashi (1992) provides a model in which a prosecutor
uses plea bargaining as a device to “buy” information from malfeasors.  Bebchuk (1984) and
Reinganum (1988) are related works.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the background of Liggett and
LeBow and the financial strategy LeBow used to acquire Liggett through his Brooke Group
investment vehicle.  Section 3 provides background information on tobacco litigation.  Section 4
examines the creation and destruction of value at Brooke Group and other firms due to strategic
actions taken by LeBow.  Section 5 concludes.
72.  History of Liggett
Started in 1822 as a snuff shop, Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co. (L&M) grew into a major
plug tobacco manufacturer by the late 19th century and became a part of the American Tobacco
Trust assembled in 1899 by James Buchanan Duke.  After the U.S. Supreme Court dissolved the
Trust in 1911, L&M emerged as one of the four largest U.S. tobacco companies, along with R.J.
Reynolds, Lorillard, and a new American Tobacco Company.  For L&M, the next half-century
was one of decline as the company dropped in tobacco sales rank.  However, the company
became highly diversified with interests in liquor, pet food, sports apparel, and other lines of
business.  In 1980 L&M was acquired in a hostile takeover by Grand Metropolitan Plc., the large
British manufacturer of food and consumer products, for $590 million.
LeBow bought L&M's tobacco operations from Grand Met in 1986 for $137 million, of
which $14 million was put up by him and a group of investors and the rest was raised through
junk bond financing.  At the time of LeBow's acquisition, L&M (by then renamed Liggett Group)
generated healthy cash flow, and LeBow received $30 million in dividends during his first year of
ownership.  He took Liggett public in October 1987, less than two weeks before the stock market
crash, selling 17 percent of his equity for $48 million.  This transaction put the value of LeBow's
remaining 83 percent stake at $240 million, which combined with the $30 million in dividends
provided a stunning one-year return on his $14 million investment (Lowenstein, 1989).
In 1990 LeBow merged his privately held Brooke Partners with Liggett and renamed the
merged company Brooke Group.  This restructuring, which encumbered Liggett’s assets with
$300 million of Brooke Partners high-yield debt, had a very unfavorable effect on Liggett's share
price.  Shareholders sued to undo the merger but were unsuccessful.  Lowenstein (1990) provides
3 Our discussion of the history of tobacco litigation draws heavily on Rabin (1992).
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a lively news account of these events.  LeBow then used Brooke Group as a holding corporation
for equity positions in other ventures, including Western Union Corp. (later renamed New Valley
Corp.) and MAI Systems, both of which were experiencing severe financial difficulties when
acquired.
LeBow undertook to raise the value of Brooke Group’s investment in Liggett by pursuing
various merger and restructuring plans within the tobacco industry.  LeBow attempted in 1988 to
merge Liggett with American Brands, the third largest cigarette manufacturer at that time, but his
informal overtures were rejected by American Brands' board.  Later he joined forces with Carl
Icahn to launch a series of proxy fights aimed at forcing RJR-Nabisco to spin off its non-tobacco
operations and merge them with Liggett.  RJR management resisted these attempts, which LeBow
abandoned soon after losing a shareholder vote in April 1996.  Near the end of his efforts to
merge with RJR, LeBow entered into the first of his series of settlements of tobacco-related
lawsuits.  While LeBow's initial settlement efforts appeared to represent tactical moves within his
battle for RJR, their impact on the tobacco industry continued long after the RJR fight ended.
3.  Tobacco litigation in the U.S.
Three waves of tobacco litigation have taken place in the United States.3  Both the fir t
wave (1950s to early 1960s) and the second (1980s to early 1990s) consisted entirely of
individual personal injury cases.  The current, third wave of litigation has been marked by a much
larger role of the federal and state governments.  Significant differences in the regulatory and legal
environments faced by the tobacco industry during each of these phases affected patterns and
4 Leading examples include Wynder and Graham (1950) and Doll and Hill (1950).  Earlier works had linked
smoking to diseases, but these lacked the rigid scientific protocol required to establish causation.  Whelan (1984) mentions
many of these early studies.
5 Examples included The New York Times (May 27, 1950), Reader's Digest (December 1952, July 1954), Life
(December 21, 1953), and "See It Now," a popular CBS television program, May 31 and June 7, 1955 broadcasts.
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outcomes of litigation.  While the tobacco industry was famous for decades for never having lost
a case, by the mid-1990s the possibility that firms would one day be held liable for large damages
seemed more likely.
3.1.  The First Wave (1950s-60s)
During the early 1950s a host of new medical studies suggested a high correlation between
smoking and the incidence of lung cancer.4  These reports received wide coverage in the popular
media.5  The first wave of cigarette litigation started soon after with the filing of Lowe v. R.J.
Reynolds, No. 9673(C) (E.D. Mo., filed Mar. 10, 1954).  More than 100 personal injury cases
were filed subsequently.  Most alleged that plaintiffs had suffered injuries either as a result of
tobacco companies' negligent failure to warn consumers of the dangers of cigarettes, or,
alternatively, because cigarette companies did not manufacture a product reasonably fit for use by
consumers.
Most of these cases, including Lowe, were simply dropped by plaintiffs without formal
disposition (Rabin, 1992), largely as a consequence of the legal defense strategy adopted by the
tobacco industry.  The industry decided to defend every claim, regardless of cost, through
exhaustive discovery, inquiry into plaintiffs' personal habits and medical histories, lengthy trials
involving numerous expert witnesses, and all necessary appeals.  The financial resources that the
industry used to underwrite this costly litigation strategy were too large to be matched by a
6 In the words of an R. J. Reynolds lawyer, "The aggressive posture we have taken regarding deposition and
discovery in general continues to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for the plaintiffs' lawyers. . . To
paraphrase General Patton, the way we won the cases is not by spending all of Reynolds' money, but by making that other
son-of-bitch spend all of his." (Hilts, 1996, p. 197).
10
typical small law firm or "lone wolf" personal injury lawyer who represented plaintiffs, generally
on a contingency-fee basis that required attorneys to bear the entire costs of litigation.6
3.2.  The Second Wave (1980s-Early 1990s)
On January 11, 1964, the U.S. Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and
Health released its report that examined data about smoking.  The essence of its findings was
contained in a summary conclusion:
 " Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to
warrant appropriate remedial action." [Emphasis in original] (U.S. Surgeon General, p.
33).
Over the next two decades, the American public experienced a great attitudinal shift towards
smoking as its appeal faded due to health concerns.  Figure III shows that after publication of the
Surgeon General's report in 1964, per capita consumption of cigarettes in the United States began
a sustained, pronounced decline.  Much federal legislation and rulemaking was enacted to restrict
the tobacco industry, including such provisions as bans on advertising in broadcast media and
prohibitions against smoking on commercial airline flights.  Table 2 presents a chronology of U.S.
regulatory milestones.
By the early 1980s, the evolution of product liability tort law had made suing the tobacco
industry more credible (Rabin 1992).  Personal injury lawyers had scored impressive victories in
asbestos, Dalkon Shield, and Agent Orange "toxic tort" cases.  These verdicts occurred partly
because of a greater willingness by state courts to impose strict liability on firms that were found
7 The relevant section of the act states, "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under the state laws with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter."
8 Cipollone vs. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).  Despite
these setbacks a jury awarded $400,000 to the plaintiffs of the Cipollone cas , the first time that the tobacco industry had
actually lost a case.  However, the award was overturned on appeal, and the plaintiffs dropped the suit in 1991 after eight
years of litigation due to lack of resources.  Kluger (1996) provides a detailed description of the progress and termination of
this suit.
9 Cipollone vs. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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to manufacture an "intrinsically dangerous" product, and lawyers hoped to convince courts to
apply this standard against cigarette manufacturers.  The most celebrated of the second wave
cases, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D. N.J. 1984), was handled by a team
of attorneys who had worked on asbestos cases.
Cigarette manufacturers mounted successful defenses against Cipollone nd similar suits
based on the principle of assumption of risk.  Ironically, these defenses generally relied on the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92 Stat. 282 (1965), which had
been passed by Congress in 1965.  Seen at the time of passage as a setback for the industry, the
act required all cigarette packages and advertisements to contain health warnings.  Defense
lawyers argued that the act, passed by the federal government, preempted damage actions under
state law challenging either the adequacy of the warnings on cigarette packages or the propriety
of cigarette companies' advertising and promotion.7  This l ne of defense was upheld by the Third
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in April 1986, and the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review this
ruling in December 1987.8  However, this issue was again considered by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1992, and this time the Court opened the doors for plaintiffs to sue cigarette companies if
evidence existed of concealment or misrepresentation of relevant information.9  This ruling had
extremely important implications for future litigation, since it implied that if the industry knew of
10 These documents, now known as "The Cigarette Papers," arrived unsolicited in a box at Professor Stanton
Glantz's office at the University of California, San Francisco.  Copies of the actual documents are deposited in the Archives
and Special Collections Department of the Library at UCSF and are available to public.  These papers have since been
admitted as evidence in a number of trials.  The story of how these documents were purloined by a paralegal working for
Brown & Williamson has been told in many newspaper stories.  An interesting source is Hilts (1996).
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dangers of smoking that it had not revealed, it could be liable for damages.
3.3.  The Third Wave (1994-Present)
In 1994 a series of events precipitated a new wave of litigation that has so far resulted in
settlements requiring the industry to pay out several hundred billion dollars in damages over the
coming years.  In April 1994, the CEOs of U.S. tobacco firms testified before a House of
Representatives subcommittee on Health and the Environment.  In these nationally televised
hearings, CEOs swore under oath that they did not believe nicotine to be addictive.  This
testimony was contradicted by the release of internal research documents of Brown & Williamson
Co. (B&W) later that year which revealed that B&W was aware of the addictive nature of
nicotine.10  In March 1995, the head of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, citing statistics
indicating that most smokers acquire the habit before 18, began a high-profile deliberation over
whether to classify nicotine and cigarettes as drugs that cause a "pediatric disease."  In May
President Clinton threw his support behind the FDA’s parallel initiatives to impose marketing
restrictions upon the industry.
Plaintiffs' lawyers joined together to file new class action cases, the most significant of
which was Castano.  More importantly, U.S. state governments also began litigation against the
tobacco companies.  Starting with a suit filed by Mississippi on May 24, 1994, states sought to
recover costs they had borne for treating tobacco-related illnesses among the welfare recipients of
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their populations.  Mississippi was immediately joined by Florida and West Virginia.  By the end
of June 1997, 39 states had sued the cigarette manufacturers, taking part in the most important
innovation to date in tobacco litigation.  The strategy was eventually emulated by a variety of
other institutional and government claimants, including pension funds, foreign governments, and
finally, the U.S. federal government in September 1999.
4.  LeBow's efforts to create value from Brooke Group’s ownership of Liggett
To understand LeBow's non-traditional attempts to limit the dangers of litigation to the
tobacco industry, one must appreciate how differently Brooke Group was financed and performed
compared to its rivals.  Table 3 presents relevant financial and product market data about the four
public U.S. cigarette companies in 1995.  Brooke Group, with 2 percent market share and slightly
more than $300 million in annual sales, was dwarfed in size by the others.  Brooke Group barely
broke even in terms of its operating profits, while its rivals earned extremely attractive margins,
and Brooke Group was far more heavily leveraged than the others.  This combination of low
profitability and high leverage implied that LeBow had little to lose if he pursued strategies that
turned out to destroy value, as the wealth reduction would largely impact Brooke Group's
creditors.  On the other hand, LeBow owned 56.5 percent of Brooke Group's equity, an
extraordinarily high ownership concentration that allowed him personally to enjoy the benefits
from any wealth creation strategy.  We believe LeBow's management of Liggett reflected these
asymmetric incentives, as he pursued extraordinarily risky tactics that would have made far less
sense in a profitable, low-levered firm with a low concentration of management ownership.
10 We were unable to implement the more standard market model approach to calculating abnormal returns
because of the atypical behavior of Brooke Group's stock up to 1995.  The stock was thinly traded and extremely volatile,
and we obtained unusual and unstable estimates of its â from his orical regressions.  T-statistics for our abnormal return
calculations are based on the standard deviation of each stock’s daily returns over the 120 trading days prior to August 1,
1995.
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4.1.  Attempts to gain control of RJR-Nabisco
LeBow's first efforts to reduce the impact of legal liabilities on the value of tobacco
companies occurred during his 1995-96 campaign for control of RJR-Nabisco.  RJR, the well-
known tobacco and food company whose 1989 leveraged buyout was the theme of the bestseller
Barbarians at the Gate, had seen its stock price languish after an initial public offering in 1991. 
Analysts widely attributed the stock's weakness to the possibility that RJR's food assets might
someday be liquidated to satisfy the damage claims of tobacco litigants.  LeBow sought to
increase the value of RJR by proposing a spinoff of the food assets as a way of removing the
hypothetical litigation encumbrance.  He also proposed to merge RJR's tobacco operations with
those of his own company, Liggett.
Table 4 and Figure IV show the abnormal wealth increases for both Brooke Group and
RJR-Nabisco during LeBow's 1995-96 restructuring efforts, which were steadfastly opposed by
RJR management.  We calculate abnormal stock returns as the difference between each company's
stock return and the return on the S&P 500 Index.11  Ab ormal changes in market capitalization
equal the product of each firm's market cap and the abnormal stock return.  All returns are
presented on a cumulative three-day basis, lasting from the day before to the day after each event.
In August 1995, LeBow received regulatory clearance from the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission to buy as much as 15 percent of RJR-Nabisco stock.  RJR also disclosed that it had
previously rejected a proposal by LeBow to combine its tobacco operations with Brooke Group's
12 The five states were Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and West Virginia.  The significance of
LeBow's actions was reflected, for example, in The Wall Street Journal's characterization of the settlement as a "shocking
capitulation at a time when other tobacco firms were still vowing never to give in."  Freedman and Hwang (1997).
13 The marketing restrictions involved refraining from the use of cartoon characters in cigarette advertising,
eliminating any coupon, value-added benefit or service appealing to children, and not advertising within 1,000 feet of
schools and playgrounds.
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Liggett unit.  Over the next two months investor Carl Icahn began a similar campaign to acquire
shares in RJR and effect a spinoff of its food operations.  Icahn and LeBow joined forces and
together acquired just under 5 percent of RJR's stock.  In October they announced plans for a
proxy fight in support of a Nabisco spinoff.  As shown by Table 4 and Figure IV, these initiatives
increased the market cap of RJR by more than a billion dollars and fueled an enormous percentage
rise in Brooke Group's stock as well.
LeBow and Icahn's non-binding spinoff proposal was narrowly passed by a special
meeting of shareholders, who gave it 50.4 percent support in a February 1996 vote.  RJR
management ignored these results and continued to oppose a spinoff, so LeBow and Icahn began
a second proxy fight to take control of RJR's board at the April annual meeting.
The battle took a dramatic turn on March 13, 1996, when Brooke Group announced the
settlement of the Castano class action lawsuit and its impending settlement of suits by the five
states that had filed Medicaid and Medicare lawsuits against the tobacco industry.12  Brooke
Group agreed to pay up to 5 percent of its Liggett unit's pre-tax profit, up to a maximum of $50
million annually, to the Castano settlement fund for each of the next 25 years.  Brooke Group
also agreed to submit Liggett's products to regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
and to cease marketing cigarettes to minors.13 One crucial element of the settlement was that its
terms would apply to any company with which Liggett merged in future, unless the mergee had
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more than 30 percent of the U.S. cigarette market. This feature was clearly aimed at the possible
merger of Liggett and RJR, since the firms' combined market share would have been slightly less
than 30 percent (RJR-Nabisco, 1996).  Brooke Group also retained the right to back out of the
settlement if any other tobacco company won a addiction-based class-action suit or managed to
overturn the class action's certification.  The settlement with the states was announced on March
15, 1996, and contained all the regulatory conditions included in the Castano set lement. 
Additionally, the five states would share 2.5 percent of Liggett's pretax profits over the next 25
years.  Other states joining the settlement would share another 5 percent of the pretax profits,
though total payments would be capped at $30 million a year.  In addition the company agreed to
pay $135 million up front into a fund to compensate the five plaintiff states and another $25
million to other states that decided to join the settlement, with these payments subject to
affiliation between RJR and Liggett.  Finally, in a stunning breach of industry solidarity, Brooke
Group promised to cooperate with states' attorneys general in their lawsuits and investigations
against other cigarette companies.
Figure V shows that investors interpreted the settlement as a favorable event for Brooke
Group and an adverse one for other tobacco companies, including RJR-Nabisco.  Brooke Group
stock shot up nearly 20 percent net-of-market on the announcement date while the stocks of other
companies fell.  All the tobacco stocks fell together over the next six days as the implications of
Brooke Group's settlement became more clear.  However, Figure V clearly shows that once
valuations stabilized, Brooke Group had risen about 10 percent net-of-market while other
companies had fallen by about the same percentage; the events can therefore be interpreted as a
14 Cumulative abnormal stock returns are significantly negative for Philip Morris, Loews, and RJR-Nabisco
throughout the event period, and significantly positive for Brooke Group only for the first two days.
15 Seven months later LeBow announced plans for another attempt to gain control of RJR-Nabisco in a proxy
fight, but he did not pursue this effort.
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transfer of value to Brooke Group from its rivals.14  LeBow at the time appeared to have cut a
more lenient deal for his company than expected by investors, in part by agreeing to assist in
enforcement actions against the other companies.
LeBow had clearly negotiated settlement terms in anticipation of bootstrapping them onto
the much larger RJR, and a merger seemed all but certain if LeBow and Icahn could win their
proxy fight for control of RJR's board.  However, LeBow's settlement tactics did not appeal to
RJR shareholders, management, or tobacco analysts, all of whom excoriated him for repudiating
the industry's litigation strategy.  Support evaporated for LeBow and Icahn's proxy campaign; the
failure of RJR's stock to rise in line with Brooke Group's after the settlement announcement
suggests that investors had not expected RJR to embrace LeBow's radical strategy.  On April 17
LeBow conceded defeat in the proxy fight and effectively ended his involvement with RJR.15 
Figure IV and Table 4 indicate that RJR's stock gave up virtually all of the net-of-market gains it
had achieved during LeBow's and Icahn's involvement.  Though Brooke Group's stock also fell as
the RJR merger initiative collapsed, it remained marginally (though not significantly) higher on a
net-of-market basis than it had been the previous August, perhaps because investors saw value in
LeBow's litigation strategy.
4.2.  Efforts to reach a comprehensive legal settlement
A resolution of legal claims could have benefitted the industry if it had less onerous
16 A clear analogy exists to criminal law, in which a defendant who cooperates with prosecutors usually receives
more lenient treatment than co-conspirators who are convicted as a result of his testimony.  At one point during Brooke
Group's series of settlements with state governments, the attorney general of Michigan remarked that "We got the least
important culprit to turn state's evidence and give testimony against the really bad guys" (Broder, 1997).
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consequences than investors were expecting from the array of government and personal injury
suits progressing through the courts.  Further, any settlement or verdict may have benefitted
certain companies more than others, if its terms were contingent on such variables as market share
or profitability.  LeBow appears to have recognized and exploited this latter possibility, as he
continued to pursue his strategy of accommodation with regulatory authorities even after it
undermined his plan to merge with RJR.  Table 5 and Figure VI illustrate the value consequences
between March 1997 and November 1998 of events that led to the $206 billion settlement
between the major tobacco companies and 46 states.  Figure VI shows that Brooke Group vastly
outperformed both the S&P 500 Index and the average of its competitors during this period
(Philip Morris, RJR, and Loews all behaved similarly, and their returns are shown in an equal-
weighted average to reduce clutter).  Though Brooke Group's stock experienced dramatic swings
during this settlement negotiation period, it generally rose during times that a settlement appeared
likely and fell when the industry was estranged from regulatory authorities.
From the point of view of government regulators, a settlement or verdict would have
created economic rents in the form of tax revenues or damage payments.  Any company that
facilitated such an event -- for example, by admitting liability and agreeing to provide evidence
against the entire industry, as Brooke Group did -- could reasonably ask regulators to share with
it the stream of benefits.16  I  is unlikely that politicians or the public would have supported direct
subsidies to Brooke Group from either taxpayers or other tobacco companies.  Nevertheless, in
settlement negotiations it proved possible to structure agreements that permitted Brooke Group
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to capture benefits indirectly.  Brooke Group was an especially logical candidate to engage in this
type of tacit cooperation with authorities against the other tobacco companies, as LeBow had no
historical stake in the industry's litigation strategy and little or no ongoing cash flow to protect. 
Indeed, virtually the entire value of Brooke Group's market capitalization after early 1996
appeared to reflect the benefits it was expected to capture from its role as a catalyst in settling
litigation, since the cash flow from its ordinary operations was barely adequate to satisfy
obligations to creditors.
Brooke Group on March 20, 1977, announced a settlement of suits brought by 22 states,
supplementing its settlements with five states one year earlier.  As part of the new agreement
LeBow agreed to issue a public statement acknowledging that smoking was responsible for
causing lung cancer and other health problems, and that nicotine is addictive.  Brooke Group
committed to pay damages of $25 million up front and up to 25 percent of Liggett's pretax
income for the next 25 years.  The deal provided for a reduction in payments if any other cigarette
maker subsequently settled with the plaintiff states.  It also required Brooke Group to hand over
all documents that could aid the plaintiffs.  This posed a substantial threat to the industry, which
had vigorously fought disclosure of internal tobacco research records.  The full force of how
damaging the such documents could be had been revealed in August 1996, when a Florida jury
awarded $750,000 in a personal injury case, the first in which the stolen internal documents of
Brown & Williamson had been admitted as evidence.
Brooke Group's settlements appeared to force the other tobacco companies to the
bargaining table and created momentum for negotiations over a comprehensive settlement of
liability issues facing the industry.  Within two weeks of Brooke Group's initial settlement, RJR-
17 The Republicans’ estrangement from the industry began after an embarrassing 1996 television interview of
presidential candidate Sen. Robert Dole on the Today program, during which Dole cast doubt on the dangers of smoking.  Soon
after, in a widely reported quote, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich said that he would not allow President Clinton "to get
to the left of me" on the tobacco issue, implying that the Republican Congress would support tobacco legislation even more
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Nabisco CEO Steven Goldstone had said for the first time that he would be interested in a
"resolution" of legal, regulatory and social controversy surrounding cigarettes (Freedman and
Hwang, 1997).  On April 16, 1997, The Wall Street Journal reported ongoing settlement talks
between the major companies, the states, and other parties.  An agreement was announced on
June 20, 1997, purporting to offer a comprehensive resolution of both government and private
claims against the industry.
Under this proposed industry-wide settlement, tobacco companies agreed to pay
approximately $368.5 billion over 25 years, including an up-front payment of $10 billion and
punitive damages of $50 billion for past wrongdoing.  The tobacco companies received some
protection from future liability, as class action suits would be banned.  Smokers who opted out of
existing class actions would be permitted to sue individually, but the total amount of awards in
their suits would be limited to $5 billion in any year.  Other settlement terms included marketing
and regulatory restrictions similar to those first agreed to by LeBow in 1996.  A thorough analysis
of the settlement and its eventual demise appears in Bulow and Klemperer (1998).
The proposed settlement required Congressional legislation for several reasons, such as
the promise that tobacco companies would receive limited immunity from class action lawsuits. 
The involvement of the U.S. House and Senate, which had not participated in the original
settlement negotiations, complicated the process greatly.  President Clinton's effective use of
tobacco as an issue in his 1996 re-election campaign had made the Republican Party wary of its
longstanding protective attitude toward tobacco.17  Congressmen and Senators therefore began
punitive than envisioned by the Democratic White House.
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rewriting the June 1997 settlement to increase its burden on the industry.
The most notable legislation was sponsored by Republican Senator John McCain, whose
bill raised the tobacco companies' future damage payments from $368.5 billion to $516 billion and
required greater marketing restrictions than envisioned in the 1997 settlement.  Other Senators
and Congressmen offered similar legislation, nearly all of it anti-tobacco.
While legislators attempted to rewrite the settlement in order to extract more economic
value from the industry, they also attempted to bend its terms in ways that would favor Brooke
Group, apparently as a reward for LeBow's role.  As described by Bulow (1998), the McCain bill
included a provision subjecting each cigarette pack to a tax of $1.10, with an exemption for those
companies holding less than 3 percent market share.  Assuming that Liggett increased its prices by
the amount of this tax while holding its market share below 3 percent, the provision amounted to
a "bonanza" potentially worth $600 million per year to Brooke Group.  LeBow's personal share of
this income stream could have made him a billionaire many times over (Passell, 1998).  Figure VI
shows that Brooke Group's stock rose steadily and dramatically between mid-1997 and early 1998
as these indirect subsidies to Liggett were discussed in Washington; when the settlement collapsed
in the late spring, Brooke Group's stock then began a decline that lasted until settlement talks
revived.
Faced with much harsher marketing restrictions and damage payments than they had
envisioned, the major tobacco companies began to distance themselves from the settlement
legislation pending before Congress and even mounted advertising campaigns against various bills. 
On April 8, 1998, RJR-Nabisco repudiated the June 1997 settlement, adding that it would
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challenge in court any new restrictions unilaterally imposed by Congress.  Other companies soon
followed RJR's lead, and by the end of April the settlement was dead.
Walking away from the June 1997 pact did not solve the industry's liability problems,
however, as states and class action attorneys resumed prosecuting their suits against the tobacco
manufacturers.  The potential cumulative cost of these actions soon appeared overwhelming.  For
example, on May 8, 1998, the companies settled with the state of Minnesota for damage payments
of $6.5 billion, and on July 6 a massive class action trial began in Florida in which several hundred
thousand smokers sought damages of $100 billion.  These numbers were large enough to bring
the tobacco companies back into negotiations within months; the climate for a revival of
negotiations also improved when the U.S. Senate tabled the harsh McCain legislation and all
related tobacco bills.
Informal talks between the industry and certain states reopened in mid-summer, and
negotiations intensified until a new settlement was reached on November 20, 1998.  The tobacco
companies agreed to pay $206 billion over 25 years to the 46 states with pending suits against the
industry (four states’ suits had already been settled).  In addition, the companies agreed to
observe marketing restrictions and finance research to curb youth smoking.  Since the agreement
required no further approval by Congress or other regulators, it was signed and became effective
soon afterward.
However, many features of the June 1997 settlement were absent from the November
1998 pact, and the industry remained far more exposed to legal liability than it would have if the
earlier agreement had taken effect.  In particular, the industry continued to face class action suits
and suits by individual smokers with no limit to potential damages.  The federal government was
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also free to pursue the industry for reimbursement of health care expenditures, which it did in a
lawsuit filed in September 1999.  An array of foreign governments, labor unions, HMOs, and
other organizations also were making use of this litigation strategy (Meier, 1988).
4.3.  LeBow’s payoff
To conclude the November 1998 settlement, the parties needed to entice Brooke Group to
abandon the legal rights that it had secured in its March 1996 and March 1997 settlements with
various state governments.  Because of those agreements, Brooke Group did not have to obey
marketing restrictions as stringent as those imposed on its rivals in the November 1998 pact, and
Brooke would pay lower per-pack damages, effectively allowing it to out-market and under-price
its rivals.  Further, Brooke Group could potentially merge with another company and acquire up
to 30 percent market share while continuing to operate under these more favorable terms.  State
attorneys general refused to proceed with an industry-wide settlement until the possibility could
be eliminated of a renegade Brooke Group undermining the pact.
A $300 million side payment from Philip Morris became the price of LeBow's agreeing to
abide by the November 1998 settlement.  The entire transaction was characterized as the sale to
Philip Morris of three of Brooke Group's brands -- L&M, Chesterfield, and Lark.  Together those
brands had 0.18 percent market share and $60 million annual sales, about 15 percent of Liggett's
annual volume, and their cash flow did not begun to justify the enormous price paid by Philip
Morris.  Essentially, LeBow had monetized the attractive settlement terms he had negotiated in
1996 and 1997.  Wall Street tobacco analysts characterized the transaction variously as "the deal
of the century," "amazing," and "LeBow beating the industry at its own game" (Schwartz, 1998;
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Obermayer, 1998).  In addition, the new settlement allowed Liggett to avoid the estimated 40
cents per pack damage payments imposed on the other companies, so long as Brooke Group's
market share remained below 1.67 percent (Edwards, 1998); this cost advantage represented a
potential $100 million in incremental annual cash flow (Obermayer, 1998).
Brooke Group's stock price rose from $9e on November 17 to $19c on November 25 as
the settlement terms and the Philip Morris transaction came to light, and the stock continued to
rise to $24d by December 31.  This huge increase in the company's equity value appeared to
validate LeBow's controversial litigation strategy.
4.4.  Parallel efforts by LeBow to resolve personal injury litigation
LeBow's litigation strategy all but eliminated Brooke Group's exposure to damages from
health care reimbursement actions brought against the tobacco companies by the 50 U.S. state
governments.  While LeBow was implementing this strategy between 1996 and 1998, he
attempted to achieve a similar low-cost resolution of claims by individual smokers, whether
brought as individual or class action lawsuits.
Brooke Group in 1998 reached a preliminary settlement of a class action lawsuit filed in
the Alabama state courts.  The agreement, in the case Fletcher v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. CV97-
913 (AL Cir. Ct., Mobile Cty.), purported to protect the company from further personal injury
litigation anywhere in the United States.  However, the settlement has been repeatedly challenged
by groups protesting its leniency toward LeBow’s company, and an adverse August 1999 ruling
cast doubt on its future.  See Tobacco Industry Litigation Reporter (1998, 1999a, 1999b), Van
Voris (1998), and Schmitt (1999)
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The Fletcher settlement would absolve Liggett of all tobacco-related claims currently
pending and all claims that would accrue during the next 25 years.  In exchange for this immunity,
Brooke Group would pay $10 million immediately plus annual payments over the next 25 years
equal to the greater of $1 million or 9 percent of Liggett's pretax profits.  The company also
consented to FDA regulation of cigarettes and a host of marketing restrictions similar to those in
its other settlements.  From a financial standpoint, the settlement was attractive to Brooke Group
partly because of Liggett's negligible operating profits; other tobacco companies would almost
certainly regard the settlement's damages formula as prohibitively expensive.
At least two legal issues have emerged as roadblocks to the agreement.  The first concerns
whether the Alabama state courts have jurisdiction to resolve claims of smokers throughout the
U.S. in the unusual "mandatory class action" format of the Fletcher case; if the settlement is
eventually approved in Alabama, this issue will almost certainly serve as the basis for years of
appeals in the U.S. federal courts.  Second, the Fletcher s ttlement received court approval as a
“limited fund class action” partly because of Brooke Group's precarious financial condition at the
time that the suit was filed.  Several groups challenging the settlement in 1999 argued that the
$300 million infusion from Philip Morris in November 1998 had significantly improved the
company's balance sheet, extinguishing the rationale for a “limited fund” proceeding in which the
company’s assets are far smaller than its expected liabilities.
The potential value to Brooke Group and other tobacco companies of limiting immunity
from personal injury suits was highlighted by two major trial verdicts against Philip Morris in early
1999.  On February 10, a California jury found against the company and awarded $51.5 million in
damages to a woman who had contracted lung cancer after smoking Philip Morris's Marlboro
18 Interestingly, Brooke Group stock did not fall as much as other companies' in the aftermath of these verdicts.  Two-
day stock price changes on February 10-11 were -11.02 percent for Philip Morris, -8.71 percent for RJR-Nabisco, 
-4.74 percent for Loews, and -2.80 percent for Brooke Group.  On March 30-31, the stock price changes were -14.57 percent
for Philip Morris, -13.61 percent for RJR, -8.15 percent for Loews, and -7.09 percent for Brooke Group (returns are statistically
significant for all companies except Brooke).
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brand for decades.  In a similar verdict on March 30, an Oregon jury assessed damages of $81
million against Philip Morris in a case brought by the family of a deceased lung cancer victim who
had also smoked Marlboros.  Though Philip Morris immediately announced plans to appeal both
verdicts (and the California award was cut in half in April by a judge), its stock price and those of
other tobacco companies fell sharply after both trials.18
5.  Conclusions
The tobacco industry in the mid-1990s faced a variety of litigation claims from consumers
and government authorities.  Bennett LeBow, CEO of cigarette manufacturer Brooke Group,
created enormous value for shareholders by adopting a litigation strategy very different from that
of his industry rivals.  While other tobacco companies steadfastly refused to settle lawsuits or
cooperate with regulatory authorities, LeBow pursued a strategy of accommodation.  By being
the first firm in the industry to reach agreements with plaintiffs, LeBow’s company secured lenient
settlement terms in exchange for cooperating in lawsuits against others.  Though LeBow's actions
contributed to massive destruction of wealth within the tobacco industry, his own small firm
increased in value substantially as regulators implicitly allowed Brooke Group to obtain a portion
of the economic rents extracted from his competitors.
Our paper extends the literature on how debt affects managerial behavior by highlighting
the connection between financial leverage and hypothetical legal liabilities.  LeBow’s apparent
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insight was to recognize that large contingent legal claims from tobacco lawsuits represented
pseudo-debt on Brooke Group’s balance sheet.  Under these conditions, LeBow rationally
pursued a high-risk strategy of attempting to increase equity value by reducing the value of other
claims against his firm’s assets.  LeBow's actions seem entirely predictable to us, given his firm's
tiny market share, negligible cash flow, levered capital structure (even in the absence of litigation),
and high ownership concentration.  Indeed, an unexplained puzzle of this story is why Philip
Morris and the other tobacco companies did not recognize this possibility and buy out Liggett
from LeBow years earlier, especially given his reputation as an unorthodox manager with little
regard for financial convention.
Our study also illustrates opportunities for value creation for both regulators and
defendant corporations during legal plea-bargaining.  In our example, government authorities
extended generous financial terms to a small player, and by doing so gained information that
facilitated value extraction from other, larger firms.  This dramatic outcome of this strategy in the
case of tobacco may influence product liability litigation in other industries such as handguns.
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Figure I
Performance of U.S. Tobacco Stocks
August 1, 1995 - September, 1999
Value of a $1.00 investment in the stocks of the four public U.S. tobacco manufacturers between August 1, 1995,
and March 1, 1999.  For comparison purposes, the dark line represents the value of a $1.00 investment in the S&P
500 Index.  Dates are chosen to coincide with Brooke Group's active efforts to resolve private and government
litigation against the tobacco industry.  The stock of R.J. Reynolds is represented by RJR-Nabisco prior to its June
15, 1999 spinoff.
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Figure II
Brooke Group’s Hypothetical Asset Value and Capital Structure
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Figure III
U.S. Per Capita Cigarette Consumption
1958-1994
Per capita consumption of cigarettes in the United States by year.  Source:
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Figure IV
Performance of Brooke Group and RJR-Nabisco Stock
August 28, 1995 - April 18, 1996
Value of a $1.00 investment in the stocks of Brooke Group and RJR-Nabisco between August 28, 1995, and April
18, 1996.  For comparison purposes, the dark line represents the value of a $1.00 investment in the S&P 500
Index.  Dates are chosen to coincide with Bennett LeBow's campaign to gain control of RJR and merge its tobacco
operations with Liggett's.  Stock return information was obtained from the CRSP database.
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Figure V
Tobacco Company Stock Returns
After Liggett's 1996 Settlement
Cumulative daily stock returns for the four U.S. tobacco manufacturers and the S&P 500 Index
around the time of Liggett's March 13, 1996, announcement of the settlement of the Castano
class action tobacco litigation.  Stock return information was obtained from the CRSP database.
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Figure VI
Tobacco Company Stock Returns During Settlement Negotiation Period
Value of a $1.00 investment in the stocks of U.S. tobacco manufacturers compared to the S&P
500 Index during the period in which the major tobacco companies attempted to negotiate a
comprehensive settlement of litigation brought by state governments and individual plaintiffs. 
Stock return information was obtained from the CRSP database.
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Table 1
Major Investment Proposals by Bennett LeBow
Major investment proposals by Bennett LeBow, whether successful or unsuccessful, apart from
his involvement with Liggett.  Information was obtained from news reports and company filings. 
In addition to those ventures listed, LeBow at various times owned interests in the jewelry,
photostatic copying, shipbuilding, and real estate industries.
Date Firm Transaction Outcome
1967 DSI Systems Company started by
LeBow
Major restructuring in
1969, sold in 1971
1980 Information Displays
Inc.
Majority equity
investment
Sold in 1984.  Buyer files
Chapter 11, sues LeBow
1985 ShowBiz Pizza Time
Inc.
Purchases 6.4 percent
and launches proxy fight
Loses shareholder vote
1985 MAI Basic Four
Information Systems
Acquired in $105 million
LBO
Files Chapter 11 in 1993
1986 Northwestern Steel and
Wire
$165 million acquisition
proposal
Rejected by shareholders
1986 Brigham's Ice cream chain acquired
for $17 million
Divested in 1991
1987 Western Union Corp.
(renamed New Valley)
LeBow acquires control
during restructuring
Files Chapter 11 in 1993
1988 Allegheny InternationalSuggests alternative
reorganization plan
Rejected by shareholders
1988 Prime Computer $970 million hostile bidRejected by management
1988 American Brands Obtains regulatory
clearance for bid
Rejected by management
1989 SkyBox International. Trading card business
started by Brooke Group
Divested in 1995
for $165 million
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Table 2
Milestones in U.S. Regulation of Tobacco
Major events involving research into health effects of smoking and U.S. government regulatory
initiatives up to 1994, before negotiations began for a comprehensive settlement of litigation
against the tobacco industry.  Information was obtained from news sources including Dow Jones
News-Retrieval and Lexis-Nexis.
Date Event
1950-53 Dr. Richard Doll, a British scientist, reports higher occurrence of lung cancer in
smokers.  Sloan-Kettering Institute publishes report relating smoking to cancer.
 
1964 U.S. Surgeon General's report on hazards of smoking.
1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act requires health warnings on
cigarette packaging and advertising.
1970 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act bans cigarette advertising on radio and
television.
1973 Civil Aeronautics Board orders separation of smokers and non-smokers on
flights.
1973 Arizona becomes first state to ban smoking in public places.
1993 Environmental Protection Agency declares second-hand smoke a carcinogen.
 
1994 CEOs of leading tobacco firms testify before Congress and are widely criticized
for claiming that smoking is not addictive.
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Table 3
Financial Characteristics of Major U.S. Cigarette Manufacturers
(1995 fiscal year)
Descriptive statistics for the four U.S.-owned cigarette manufacturers in 1995.  Financial data
were obtained from the CRSP and Compustat databases.  Share ownership data were obtained
from company proxy statements, and product information was obtained from tobacco trade
publications.  The remaining market share was held by Brown & Williamson and American
Brands, two wholly-owned subsidiaries of the U.K. tobacco manufacturer B.A.T. Plc.  All dollar
amounts are in millions.  EBDIT stands for earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes, and
total capital equals the market value of equity plus the book value of long-term debt.
Brooke Group
(Liggett)
Loews
(Lorillard)
Philip
Morris
RJR-
Nabisco
Sales
EBDIT
EBDIT / sales
$338
$14
4%
$17,239
$2,364
14%
$53,139
$12.141
23%
$16,008
$3,610
23%
Market value of equity
Long-term debt
Long term debt / total capital
$160
$407
72%
$4,623
$3,950
46%
$75,335
$13,107
15%
$8,283
$10,383
56%
Largest shareholder
(% holding)
Bennett LeBow
(56.5%)
 Tisch family
(15.8%)
Fidelity 
(6.1%)
Fidelity
(12.6%)
Market Share 2% 7% 43% 28%
Leading Brands L&M,
Chesterfield
Newport,
Kent
Marlboro,
Va. Slims
Winston,
Camel
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Table 4
Major Events in LeBow's Battle for Control of RJR-Nabisco
Major events and associated stock market reactions during Bennett LeBow's 1995-96 battle for
control of RJR-Nabisco.  The table presents three-day abnormal returns for the stock of both Brooke
Group and RJR-Nabisco, measured in both percent change in stock price and increase in market
capitalization (in millions).  Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the stock price
return and the return on the S&P 500 Index.  T-statistics appear in parentheses below abnormal
market capitalization changes.
Three-Day Abnormal Returns
Brooke Group RJR-Nabisco
Excess
Return
Market
Cap. Ä
Excess
Return
Market
Cap. Ä Date Event
10.55% $9
(1.36)
6.01% $438 
** (2.06) 
8/30/95LeBow receives antitrust clearance
to buy 15 percent of RJR-Nabisco;
RJR discloses rejection of proposal
to merge tobacco operations
58.75% $63
*** (7.58)
6.54% $542
** (2.25)
9/20/95Icahn seeks FTC approval to
acquire 15 percent of RJR
9.62% $13
(1.24)
3.36% $272
(1.15)
10/30/95LeBow and Icahn announce 4.8
percent stake in RJR, ask RJR to
spin off food division
0.03% $0
(0.00)
(3.53%) ($291)
(1.21)
11/2/95RJR management rejects proposal
for spinoff of food business
(6.83%) ($10)
(0.88)
4.26% $341
(1.46)
12/6/95RJR CEO Charles Harper resigns
8.77% $11
(1.13)
(3.39%) ($288)
(1.16)
12/20/95New RJR CEO Steven Goldstone
reiterates objections to spinoff
9.92% $15
(1.28)
2.85% $255
(0.98)
2/21/96LeBow and Icahn win proxy battle
with 50.4 percent; management still
refuses spinoff; LeBow and Icahn
launch proxy fight for board
16.51% $25
** (2.13)
(4.62%) ($435)
(1.58)
3/13/96LeBow announces settlement of
Castano class action litigation
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(8.47%) ($13)
(1.09)
(1.04%) ($89)
(0.36)
04/09/96Institutional Shareholder Services
recommends voting against LeBow
and Icahn due to settlement
(14.67%) ($21)
* (1.89)
0.25% $20
(0.08)
04/17/96LeBow concedes defeat in proxy
vote
31.76% $26
(0.56)
0.60% $44
(0.03)
Entire Period
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels, respectively.
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Table 5
Major Events in Tobacco Settlement Negotiations
Major events and associated stock market reactions during the period in which the major tobacco
companies attempted to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of litigation brought by state
governments and individual plaintiffs.  The table presents three-day abnormal returns for the stock of
Brooke Group and an equal-weighted average of the stocks of Philip Morris, RJR-Nabisco, and
Loews, as well as abnormal market capitalization changes for Brooke Group and for the sum total of
the three other tobacco companies.  Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the
stock price return and the return on the S&P 500 Index.  T-statistics appear in parentheses below
abnormal market capitalization changes.
Three-Day Abnormal Returns
Brooke Group
Other Tobacco
Companies
Excess
Return
Market
Cap. Ä
Mean
Excess
Return
Total
Market
Cap. Ä Date Event
20.30%
(5.08%)
(10.03%)
21.01%
(6.03%)
2.20%
$16
*** (2.62)
($5)
(0.66)
($8)
(1.29)
$15
*** (2.71)
($14)
(0.78)
$5
(0.28)
(6.39%)
4.32%
(2.82%)
1.52%
(7.06%)
1.71%
($11,957)
*** (4.72)
$6,210
** (2.51)
($5,210)
** (2.12)
$426
(0.18)
($8,133)
*** (4.16)
$2,644
(1.51)
3/20/97
4/16/97
6/20/97
8/27/97
4/1/98
4/8/98
Brooke Group reaches settlement
with 22 states
Wall Street Journal reports rumors of
industry-wide settlement negotiations
Comprehensive settlement
announced, pending Congressional
approval
Citing expected settlement costs,
Philip Morris declines to raise
dividend
Senate Commerce Committee votes 
19-1 to support harsh McCain bill
RJR-Nabisco repudiates settlement;
other companies follow
43
(11.80%)
(3.00%)
($19)
(1.52)
($2)
(0.39)
1.94%
3.52%
$2,931
* (1.76)
$2,118
(1.09)
6/18/98
8/26/98
Senate votes to delay further action
on McCain bill
Negotiations reopen between states
and companies
70.02% $96
*** (9.03)
2.03% $2,755
(1.19)
11/20/98Settlement with 46 states announced;
Brooke Group receives $300 million
from Philip Morris for three brands
195.24% $154
** (2.11)
(20.38%) ($7,611)
(0.25)
Entire Period
Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels, respectively.
